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Abstract 
 
This Article explores the role of insurance as a substitute for 
direct regulation of risks posed by severe weather. In pricing 
the risk of human activity along the predicted path of 
storms, insurance can provide incentives for efficient 
location decisions as well as for cost-justified mitigation 
effort in building construction and infrastructure. Currently, 
however, much insurance for severe weather risks is 
provided and heavily subsidized by the government. The 
Article demonstrates two primary distortions arising from 
the government’s dominance in these insurance markets. 
First, the subsidies are allocated differentially across 
households, resulting in a significant regressive 
redistribution, favoring affluent homeowners in coastal 
communities. The Article provides some empirical measures 
of this effect. Second, the subsidies induce excessive 
development (and redevelopment) of storm-stricken and 
erosion-prone areas.  While political efforts to scale down 
the insurance subsidies have so far failed, by exposing the 
unintended costs of government-subsidized insurance this 
Article contributes to reevaluation of the social regulation of 
weather risk. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Catastrophes due to severe weather are perhaps the costliest 
accidents humanity faces.
1
 While we are still a long way from having 
technologies that would abate the destructive force of storms, there is 
much we could do to reduce their impact.  True, we cannot regulate the 
weather. But through smart governance and well designed incentives, we 
can influence human exposure to the risk of bad weather.  We may not 
be able to control high winds or storm surges, but we can encourage 
people to build sturdier homes with stronger roofs far from flood plains. 
We call weather-related catastrophes “natural disasters,” but the losses 
due to severe weather are the result of a combination of natural forces 
and often imprudent and shortsighted human decisions induced by 
questionable government policies.
2
 
Regulating weather risk is an increasingly urgent social issue. 
There is little doubt that the frequency and magnitude of weather-related 
disasters are rising over time.
3
 Although the precise combination of 
causes may be debated—emissions of greenhouse gases? natural climatic 
cycles? increased concentration of populations in coastal areas?
4—the 
                                                        
1
 As of 2008, of the twenty mostly costly insured catastrophes in the world, 
eighteen were weather related.  The other two were the 9/11 and the Northridge 
Earthquake. HOWARD C. KUNREUTHER & ERWANN O. MICHEL-KERJAN, AT WAR 
WITH THE WEATHER: MANAGING LARGE-SCALE RISKS IN A NEW ERA OF 
CATASTROPHES 28-29 (2009).   
2
 See, e.g., WORLD BANK, NATURAL HAZARDS, UNNATURAL DISASTERS: THE 
ECONOMICS OF EFFECTIVE PREVENTION 23 (2010) (“[N]atural disasters, despite the 
adjective, are not ‘natural.’ Although no single person or action may be to blame, 
death and destruction result from human acts of omission—not tying down the 
rafters allows a hurricane to blow away the roof—and commission—building in 
flood-prone areas. Those acts could be prevented, often at little additional 
expense.”) 
3
 See, e.g., Adam B. Smith & Richard W. Katz, US Billion-Dollar Weather and 
Climate Disasters: Data Sources, Trends, Accuracy & Biases, 67 NAT. HAZARDS 
387 (2013) (evaluating data on insured losses published at NAT’L OCEANIC & 
ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN., BILLION-DOLLAR WEATHER/CLIMATE DISASTERS (2013), 
available at http://www.ncdc.noaa.gov/billions/events).  This study estimates the 
measure of total losses at $1.1 trillion for the period from 1980 to 2011. Id. at 388.  
4
 For an argument that, although climate change is undeniably occurring and is 
affected by human influence (mainly through carbon emissions), the relationship 
between climate change and severe weather has been overstated, see the work of 
Professor Roger Pielke Jr., summarized and referenced in An Obama Advisor Is 
Attacking Me for Testifying that Climate Change Hasn’t Increased Extreme 
Weather, THE NEW REPUBLIC (Mar. 5, 2014), 
http://www.newrepublic.com/article/116887/does-climate-change-cause-extreme-
weather-i-said-no-and-was-attacked.  For evidence that at least one cause is 
increasing population density around the coasts, see sources cited infra note 8. 
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trend is undisputed. Hurricane Katrina in 2005 and Hurricane Sandy in 
2012 brought unprecedented property damage to the Gulf states and to 
the coastal northeastern states;
5
 and in 2013 Typhoon Haiyan, which 
devastated the Philippines, eliminating entire villages and killing 
thousands, may have been the strongest tropical cyclone to hit land in 
recorded history.
6
 Beyond anecdotes, the trend is clear: weather-disaster 
losses are rising.
7
 
As the magnitude and frequency of weather patterns seem to pose 
a higher risk than ever, a large and growing fraction of humanity’s 
physical assets is located in harm’s way. 8  Thus, the combination of 
severe natural forces and increased human exposure pose one of the 
major public policy challenges of our era: how to regulate behavior so as 
to reduce this risk. 
There are many ways that societies can reduce the risk of 
increasingly large and potentially devastating storms. Our thesis in this 
article is simple: the most effective way to prepare for storms is through 
insurance.  But not in the obvious way commonly understood—of 
insurance as a form of post-disaster relief. Rather, we mean insurance as 
a form of private regulation of safety—a contractual device controlling 
and incentivizing behavior prior to the occurrence of losses.  
This argument—that insurance can create incentives for risk 
mitigation—might surprise some of our readers. Like many, they have 
been schooled in the paradigm that insurance creates moral hazard. 
Insurance may be good as a form of post-disaster relief and risk shifting, 
                                                        
5
 Christopher F. Schuetze, 2012: The Year of Extreme Weather, N.Y. TIMES IHT 
RENDEZVOUS BLOG (Jan. 14, 2013, 9:48 AM), 
http://rendezvous.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/01/14/2012-the-year-of-extreme-
weather/. In 2012, there were eleven weather and climate disaster events in the U.S. 
with losses exceeding $1 billion. These eleven events cumulatively caused 
approximately $116 billion in damages and 113 deaths, making 2012 the second 
costliest year since 1980). In 2005, total damages equaled $198 billion. NAT’L 
OCEANIC & ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN., BILLION-DOLLAR WEATHER/CLIMATE 
DISASTERS (2013), available at http://www.ncdc.noaa.gov/billions/summary-stats. 
6
 Typhoon Haiyan: Worse Than Hell, THE ECONOMIST, Nov. 16, 2013. 
7 See, e.g., Smith & Katz, supra note 3, at 4 (using NOAA data); Peter Hoeppe, Why 
are Cities Particularly Affected by Climate Change?, GENEVA ASSOC. available at 
https://www.genevaassociation.org/media/907365/ga_6th_eecr_seminar_hoeppe.pdf. 
8
 NAT’L OCEANIC & ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN., NATIONAL COASTAL POPULATION 
REPORT: POPULATION TRENDS FROM 1970 TO 2020 3 (2013) (showing the higher 
rate of population density growth in coastal regions than national rate); Brenden 
Jongman et al., Global Exposure to River and Coastal Flooding, 22 GLOBAL 
ENVTL. CHANGE 823, 829 (2012) (showing relative changes in population exposed 
to coastal flooding over changes in total population, 1970–2010). 
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but the downside is that it dulls the insured party’s incentive to mitigate 
losses. 
We think that the application of the moral hazard theory to 
insurance has been overstated. We have written an article dedicated to 
debunking the myth that insurance necessarily creates moral hazard.
9
 We 
showed that insurers of all sorts of risks use a variety of contractual tools 
to create counter-incentives and prompt policyholders to reduce risks. 
While it is true that in some settings the presence of insurance coverage 
can induce inefficient precautions, the opposite can also be true: through 
powerful incentives provided in the insurance contract, people who 
purchase insurance often do not fall prey to the moral hazard distortion, 
and may even take more efficient precaution relative to the uninsured. 
This general observation, based on empirical examination of insurance 
contracts, holds also for weather-related risks: the insurance relationship 
could prompt policyholders to take a more, rather than less, care. 
Deploying their superior access to risk data and prediction methods, and 
pressured by competition to keep premiums affordable, insurers prompt 
policyholders to mitigate their exposure to severe weather. An entire 
community’s preparedness for severe weather is importantly shaped and 
potentially improved by the aggregation of insurance contracts held by 
the community’s members. 
 
But in the U.S., insurance is denied its potential role as an 
efficient regulator of pre-storm conduct. It does not induce rational 
precautions by individuals, cost-justified community development by 
localities, or efficient infrastructure investment. American insurance fails 
to achieve these straightforward and enormously important roles for a 
reason that can be stated in one sentence: insurance policies for weather 
related losses are not priced to reflect the real risk. As a result of 
government intervention in property insurance markets, through either 
rate regulation or direct government provision of subsidized insurance, 
private markets no longer generate prices signals regarding the cost of 
living in severe weather regions.  The cost of insurance is suppressed, 
thus failing to alert private parties who purchase property insurance to 
the true risk of living dangerously. It allows these private parties to 
(rationally) assume excessive risk, and dump the cost of living in the 
path of storms on others. Indeed, much of the development of storm-
stricken coastal areas is due to insurance subsidies, and would likely not 
have happened at the same magnitude otherwise.
10
  
                                                        
9
 See Omri Ben-Shahar & Kyle D. Logue, Outsourcing Regulation: How Insurance 
Reduces Moral Hazard, 111 MICH. L. REV. 197 (2012). 
10
 The Article here builds on the work of numerous researchers who have long 
studied the subject of catastrophic weather risks, some of whom have reached 
conclusions similar to the ones that we reach—including the observation that 
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Public debates over subsidized weather insurance often choose 
ignore or downplay the over-development and excessive risk distortion, 
because they regard government’s intervention in weather insurance 
markets has an important upside that trumps any efficiency distortion. 
Government intervention is in property insurance markets is justified and 
even necessary because—so goes the argument—it makes insurance for 
severe weather affordable. Insurance subsidies are necessary to help 
support low income and working class people who might otherwise be 
unable to afford insurance and would therefore not be able to buy or 
remain in their homes. Subsidizing weather insurance is “our moral duty 
to the poorest people and working people and lower middle income 
people,”11 preventing “working families who are doing everything they 
can to put food on the table” from losing their homes.12 The subsidy, in 
other words, is thought to promote a redistribution that benefits 
economically weak populations. 
 
We have long suspected that this justification is false. Our 
suspicion rested on the puzzling differential treatment of hurricanes 
versus tornados. These two types of severe storms cause similar 
aggregate magnitude of property destruction,
13
 but federal subsidies 
apply to flood losses caused by hurricanes, not to wind losses caused by 
tornadoes. This was puzzling because hurricane victims live closer to 
water than tornado victims, and it is generally known that living close to 
water is a privilege of the affluent. This pattern, of subsidies going only 
to some classes of victims of severe weather but not to all, seemed 
inconsistent with the affordability-of-insurance rationale.  
 
To explore this suspicion we looked at the data and report it here. 
We examined insurance data from the government run insurance 
program in Florida, which subsidizes homeowners insurance in the state 
                                                                                                                                       
publicly provided catastrophe insurance and relief payments can undermine 
efficient incentives to minimize weather-related harms.  Howard Kunreuther in 
particular is a pioneer in this field. See, e.g., Howard Kunreuther, Mitigating 
Disaster Losses through Insurance, 12 J. RISK & INS. 171 (1996). See also 
KUNREUTHER & MICHEL-KERJAN, supra note 1; PAYING THE PRICE: THE STATUS 
AND ROLE OF INSURANCE AGAINST NATURAL DISASTER IN THE UNITED STATES 
(Howard Kunreuther & Richard J. Roth, Sr., eds. 1998); Martin F. Grace & Robert 
W. Klein, The Perfect Storm: Hurricanes, Insurance, and Regulation, 12 RISK 
MGMT. & INS. REV. 81 (2009); and J. David Cummins, Should the Government 
Provide Insurance for Catastrophes?, 88 FED. RES. BANK OF ST. LOUIS REV. 337 
(2006). 
11
 Barney Frank 
12
 (S. Heidi Heitkamp). 
13
 Cite annual costs of hurricanes and tornadoes 
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most vulnerable to severe weather impact. We find strong correlation 
between subsidy and wealth. Our data shows that wealthier households 
receive higher subsidies in the form of underpriced insurance. And the 
magnitudes of the wealth effects are surprisingly large.  
 
Our study, and in particular our findings regarding the correlation 
between wealth and subsidy, are intended to shed light on recent 
legislative activity, which, unfortunately, only made things worse. In the 
aftermath of Hurricane Sandy and the enormous bill that FEMA – the 
agency that administers the federal subsidies for flood insurance—had to 
foot, Congress enacted with bipartisan support the Biggert Waters Flood 
Insurance Reform Act of 2012. It intended to scale back the subsidies 
and had the potential to provide better incentives for human preparedness 
to floods.  
 
But Congress did not let this laudable new statute live long 
enough to do any good. Immediately after it was enacted, subsidy 
recipients, now scheduled to lose their subsidies, protested, and Congress 
quickly reacted—again, with a rare showing of bipartisan consensus—
enacting what amounts to almost a full repeal of the 2012 reform. The 
Homeowner Flood Insurance Affordability Act of 2014 restored the 
federal subsidies and cross-subsidies for flood insurance. Our results 
show that the rhetorical premise invoked by supporters of this act—that 
hard working low-income people need it to keep their homes—is 
misguided. The beneficiaries of weather insurance subsidies are not low 
income folks. This finding is consistent with some prior work on the 
distributional consequences of government-provided flood insurance at 
the national level.
14
 
 
We begin our analysis with a brief conceptual section that 
explains how property insurance can operate as a regulator of weather 
risk—what tools insurance contracts use to improve the severe weather 
preparedness of their policyholders. Section II then reviews (again, 
briefly) the features of government-provided insurance for severe 
weather, focusing on two programs: the National Flood Insurance 
Program, and Florida’s state owned Citizens Insurance. Section III is the 
heart of our article (and readers are more than welcome to skip I and II 
and head directly to where our incremental contribution lies). It presents 
                                                        
14
 J. Scott Holladay & Jason A. Schwartz, Flooding the Market: The Distributional 
Consequences of the NFIP, Pol’y Br. No. 7, N.Y.U. Inst. for Pol’y Integrity (2010), 
at 4, (http://policyintegrity.org/documents/FloodingtheMarket.pdf.)  But see 
Okmyun Bin, John A. Bishop, & Carolyn Kousky, Redistributional Effects of the 
National Flood Insurance Program, 000(00) PUBLIC FINANCE REVIEW 1 (2012) 
(reaching the opposite conclusion). 
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and defends our two normative claims: Government insurance creates (i) 
unfair pooling of risk, favoring affluent policyholders, and (ii) it leads to 
inefficient preparedness, locating far too many assets in the predictable 
path of storms.  
 
I. REGULATION OF WEATHER RISK BY INSURANCE 
 
Weather risks can be reduced by direct command-and-control 
government regulation, mandating standards of pre-disaster conduct. 
Common examples include the adoption of building codes that require 
structures to be resistant to severe storms and other harsh conditions, or 
zoning restrictions that stop people from moving into the predicted path 
of storms. Private insurance contracts are a different type of regulation. 
Lacking the authority to mandate conduct, insurance companies create 
contractual incentives for insureds to engage in precautionary behaviors 
that cost less than the risk they reduce.  
Whereas command is the ultimate regulatory lever of a 
government agency, insurers use price. The insurance company’s way of 
creating incentives to reduce risk is to award lower prices to 
policyholders who face lower expected harms. Providing a menu of 
differentiated premiums induces individuals and firms to behave in ways 
that qualify for the insurance discounts. Auto insurers, for example, 
provide premium discounts for those who drive safer cars, less often, and 
accident-free. Life insurers charge lower premiums for not smoking or 
scuba diving. And property insurers discount homes that face lower risk 
of loss due to severe weather. 
In some areas of insured activity, insurers may not have the 
proper information to provide accurate discounts in return for 
policyholders’ safety investment (although monitoring technologies 
increasing make such information available).
15
 But asymmetric 
information is generally not a problem in regards to weather insurance. 
On the contrary, property insurers, both private and public, typically 
have much of the risk-relevant information on weather hazards, 
information far superior to that which homeowners have.   
An insurance policy that is priced according to risk features can 
become a powerful regulator of behavior. Differentiated premium make 
it more costly for people to forgo safety investments. Policyholders are 
                                                        
15
 See Georges Dionne et al., Adverse Selection in Insurance Contracting, in 
HANDBOOK OF INSURANCE 231 (Georges Dionne ed., 2013); Alma Cohen & Peter 
Siegelman, Testing for Adverse Selection in Insurance Markets, 77 J. RISK & INS. 
39 (2010). 
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free to decide whether or not to install storm windows or roof anchors; 
no insurance broker is going to tell them that they must. But in regions in 
which these installations are cost-effective, the premium discounts would 
more than offset the cost. 
One nice feature of this form of safety regulation is avoiding the 
crude trade-off inherent in command-and-control mandates. There is no 
need for the regulator to make an up-or-down binary choice whether to 
permit or prohibit some action.  Instead, insurers build into the prices of 
their contracts the expected risk reduction associated with each safety 
investment, and then policyholders are allowed to self-select. Zoning 
regulations, for example, may require homes to be built at particular 
elevations, or may mandate the use of stilts or pilings, to maximize the 
chances that the homes will survive a storm surge. Insurance regulation, 
by contrast, does not mandate but instead provides a menu of options—
premium discounts to homes that invest in different degrees of 
precautions. Some, but not all, policyholders may choose to make the 
investments. The sorting that results from this menu approach to 
regulation avoids the over- (or under-) inclusiveness of government-
mandated, across-the-board, all-or-nothing safety requirements.  
Differentiated risk-based premiums affect not only the 
investment in precautions but also the level of the insured’s activity. In 
the context of weather insurance, this activity-calibrating effect is 
enormously important. A crucial element of humanity’s preparedness for 
severe weather is the determination where to live, and in particular, 
where not to live. If the cost of exposure to severe weather is fully 
captured by the insurance rate, and thus fully borne by homeowners, they 
would make optimal location decisions (prompted by their mortgage 
lenders who require them to purchase full insurance). The leisure value 
of oceanfront living would be traded off against the full cost of such 
living, which should include the full insurance cost.  
The main tool for insurance regulation of severe weather 
preparedness is the homeowners’ insurance policy, which, with the 
exception of flood damage (discussed below), covers most storm-caused 
losses (primarily wind damage).  The main factor that determines the 
premium differentials across policies is location: areas with most storm 
activity face the highest premiums. Location pricing depends both on 
historical data as well as prediction models, demographic trends, and 
construction practices.
16
 Premiums may be reduced dramatically 
                                                        
16
 See Cassandra R. Cole, David A. Macpherson & Kathleen A. McCullough, A 
Comparison of Hurricane Loss Models, 33 J. INS. ISSUES 31 (2010); Aarti Dinesh, 
How Catastrophe Experts Model Hurricane-Induced Storm Surge, INSURANCE 
JOURNAL (July 1, 2013), 
http://www.insurancejournal.com/magazines/features/2013/07/01/296787.htm. 
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according to particular construction specifications.
17
  For example, 
hurricane loss models used by insurance companies estimate that a home 
with a hip (pyramid shaped) roof  tend to sustain four percent less 
damage than a home with a roof with gable ends.
18
 In fact, flood 
insurance sold by private insurers depends on so many risk and 
mitigation factors that the rating sheet used by brokers to determine 
premiums is thirty pages long.
19
  
The potential of regulation by insurance is, of course, limited by 
various transactions costs. Some information is not worth sorting, even 
for the insurance industry. Some safety investments are not incentivized 
because they have long-term or external social value not captured by the 
insured. With homeowners’ insurance, for example, most policies are 
sold not on new construction but on existing buildings, at a time when 
various structural safety investments can no longer be made and thus can 
no longer be regulated by the policies. But buyers of new homes would 
take into account the overall cost of purchasing the asset, including 
insurance costs (and future insurance costs affecting the resale value), 
thus internalizing the risk and its mitigation costs into the decision of the 
land developer. Nevertheless, and despite the relative information 
efficiency of insurance markets, regulation by insurance is limited by the 
information available at the time of new construction.  
In the context of weather risks, private insurance also enhances 
the regulatory benefits of municipal building codes. Since storm 
resistance depends to a large extent also on municipal building codes, the 
private insurance industry rates the different localities’ home-building 
standards and how well they are enforced. These building-
code=effectiveness ratings are used by individual insurers to vary their 
                                                        
17
 For example, at least four states permit property insurers to discount premiums if 
the insured property is certified according to standards created by the insurance 
industry’s research center, the Insurance Institute for Business and Home Safety. 
FORTIFIED Home™: Hurrican Financial Incentives, INSURANCE INSTITUTE FOR 
BUSINESS & HOME SAFETY, http://www.disastersafety.org/wp-
content/uploads/FORTIFIED-Home-Incentives_IBHS.pdf (listing Alabama, 
Georgia, Mississippi, and North Carolina as states allowing or requiring incentive 
programs by insurers based on IBHS certification); see also FORTIFIED Overview, 
INSURANCE INSTITUTE FOR BUSINESS & HOME SAFETY 
https://www.disastersafety.org/fortified-main/ (last visited Dec. 29, 2014) 
(explaining the IBHS certification process).  
18
 Cole, Macpherson & McCullough, supra note __ at 38. 
19
 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-13-568, FLOOD INSURANCE: 
IMPLICATIONS OF CHANGING COVERAGE LIMITS AND EXPANDING COVERAGE 15 
(2013), available at http://www.gao.gov/assets/660/655719.pdf  [hereinafter GAO-
13-568, FLOOD INSURANCE]. 
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premiums across the rated districts.
20
 For example, the rating may vary 
with the type of foundation the jurisdiction mandates for building in the 
floodplain, how it addresses post-disaster reconstruction permits, the 
funding it allocates to building code enforcement, how it trains its 
inspectors, and the standards it uses to review design of new 
construction.
21
 This puts pressure on state and local governments to 
tighten their building codes and their enforcement of those codes.  
 
II. GOVERNMENT-PROVIDED WEATHER INSURANCE 
  
The previous part examined the tools that insurance markets use 
to regulate behavior before weather disasters strike, with the primary tool 
being insurers’ ability to rate risks—to charge relatively high premiums 
for properties located in high-risk areas or properties that lack state-of-
the-art weather mitigation features.  We now turn to examine how 
government-provided weather insurance works, and how it differs from 
private insurance.    
Why, you might wonder, is the government involved in weather 
insurance in the first place?  Why not leave all weather risk insurance to 
the private market?  There are several rationales commonly offered to 
justify governments acting as insurers of weather risk.   
First, it is sometimes argued that truly catastrophic weather 
events are sufficiently rare that property owners systematically 
underestimate the risk.
22
 According to this behavioral account, 
purchasers of weather insurance do not fully appreciate the risk of severe 
weather and are therefore unwilling to pay actuarially fair premiums that 
insurers’ require to provide coverage.  
                                                        
20
 See Rating the States: An Assessment of Residential Building Code and 
Enforcement Systems for Life Safety and Property Protection in Hurricane-Prone 
Regions, INSURANCE INSTITUTE FOR BUSINESS & HOME SAFETY available at 
http://www.disastersafety.org/wp-content/uploads/ibhs-rating-the-states.pdf.  
 
21
 See Building Code Effectiveness Grading Schedule (BCEGS
®
) Questionnaire 
(ISO Properties, Inc. 2004), available at 
http://www.isrb.com/pubs/BCEGS%20Questionnaire.pdf. 
22
 See Joshua Aaron Randlett, Comment, Fair Access to Insurance Requirements, 
15 OCEAN & COASTAL L.J. 127 (2010) (describing private insurers’ withdrawal 
from coastal Massachusetts markets, leaving residents with only a state agency 
from which to purchase property insurance); see also HOWARD C. KUNREUTHER ET 
AL., INSURANCE & BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS 113–16 (2013) (describing the 
demand anomaly of failure to protect against low-probability, high-consequence 
events) 
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Second, the problem may lie not with the demand for, but rather 
with the supply of flood coverage. Weather calamities may be too large 
or correlated to be insured through private markets. Or they may be too 
difficult to predict and price in accordance with prevailing actuarial 
practices. This would be consistent with assertions from insurance 
industry analysts that, at least during periods of tight markets, there is 
often insufficient insuring capacity, even within reinsurance markets.
23
  
Third, government provision of weather insurance may be 
necessary for affordability (redistributive) reasons. Even if policyholders 
were seeking to purchase and insurers were willing to provide actuarially 
priced weather disaster insurance, many policyholders simply could not 
afford such coverage, especially in areas where the risk is large and thus 
costly to insure.
24
  
These rationales purport to provide the theoretical basis for 
government-provided weather-risk insurance. What form it should take 
is a separate question.  In the remainder of this Part, we briefly discuss 
two programs, in which the government acts like an insurance company: 
issuing (or subsidizing the issuance of) actual insurance contracts, 
charging premiums, and paying coverage to its premium-paying clients. 
To be sure, the government also insures weather risk through post-
disaster relief, through the Disaster Relief Fund,
25
 providing benefits to 
victims who suffer qualifying losses, paid for not by collecting premiums 
but though tax revenue.
26
 The relief includes relatively small grants (up 
to $30,0000)
27
 or loans.
28
 The government also provides some disaster 
                                                        
23
 See generally KUNREUTHER & MICHEL-KERJAN, supra note __, at 189-195 
(discussing question of reinsurance capacity). 
24
 See Richard A. Derrig et. al, Catastrophe Management in a Changing World, 11 
RISK MANAGEMENT & INS. REV. 269, 272 (2008). 
25
 See Disaster Relief Fund: Monthly Report, FED. EMERGENCY MGMT. AGENCY, 
http://www.fema.gov/disaster-relief-fund (last updated Dec. 9, 2014); Public 
Assistance: Local, State, Tribal, and Non-Profit, FED. EMERGENCY MGMT. 
AGENCY, http://www.fema.gov/public-assistance-local-state-tribal-and-non-profit 
(last updated July 24, 2014). The federal government covers only 75 percent of 
disaster-related expenses, while states have to contribute the remaining 25 percent. 
See 42 U.S.C. § 5174(g) (2013). States, however, can petition to increase the 
federal share as high as 100 percent. 
26
 The Disaster Relief Fund was created by the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief 
and Emergency Assistance Act, 42 U.S.C §§ 5121–5208 (2013).  According to the 
Stafford Act, each state, through its governor, must request assistance from the 
President. Id. at § 5170. As part of this request, the state must assert that the state 
has an emergency plan that has been implemented, but that the state’s plan is not 
sufficient to meet the need resulting from the disaster.   
27
 See generally Disaster Loan Program, U.S. SMALL BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION, 
http://www.sba.gov/content/disaster-loan-program (last visited Nov. 5, 2014).  
Federal disaster declarations occur with some frequency.  Between 2004 and 2011, 
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relief by subsidizing private disaster-aimed charity, through the 
charitable contributions deduction. But although charitable disaster relief 
can grow very large, it is dwarfed by government relief and by 
subsidized government insurance,
 29
  to which we now turn.  
1. The National Flood Insurance Program 
Prior to the adoption of federally provided flood policies, flood 
risks were covered through private insurance contracts sold by 
commercial insurance companies.  But they were not part of the basic 
homeowners insurance policy; instead, they had to be purchased as an 
added coverage, priced separately. Because, as we explained above, 
many property owners opted not to purchase the flood coverage, the 
federal government disaster relief fund was called upon for flood relief 
when the big floods eventually hit.  The National Flood Insurance 
Program (NFIP) was created to provide relief from flood losses in a way 
that minimized the financial burden on federal taxpayers.   
Through the NFIP, the federal government sells flood insurance 
policies to residential and commercial property.  Although NFIP policies 
are marketed largely through private insurance companies, they are fully 
underwritten by the federal government.
30
 Coverage under NFIP flood 
                                                                                                                                       
the President received state requests for 629 disaster declarations, of which 539 (or 
86 percent) were approved.   
28
 42 U.S.C. § 5174(h) (2013) (setting maximum disaster relief award at $25,000 
per disaster, adjusted annually for inflation). In addition to repairs and 
reconstruction, FEMA will cover temporary housing as well as, disaster-related 
medical, clothing, fuel, moving and storage, and even burial expenses. Disaster 
Assistance Available from FEMA, FED. EMERGENCY MGMT. AGENCY,  
http://www.fema.gov/disaster-assistance-available-fema (last visited Nov. 5, 2014). 
29
 For example, hurricane Katrina, which was the most expensive disaster in U.S. 
history, led to charitable relief of roughly $2.5 billion. U.S. GOV’T 
ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-06-297T, HURRICANES KATRINA AND RITA: 
PROVISION OF CHARITABLE ASSISTANCE (2005), available at 
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d06297t.pdf. The federal disaster relief, by 
comparison, for the 2005 hurricane season, exceeded $100 billion. MATT 
FELLOWES & AMY LIU, BROOKINGS INSTITUTION, FEDERAL ALLOCATIONS IN 
RESPONSE TO KATRINA, RITA AND WILMA: AN UPDATE (2006), available at 
http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/reports/2006/8/metropolitanpolic
y%20fellowes/20060712_katrinafactsheet.pdf. By further comparison, private 
insurance coverage for Katrina totaled $41.1 billion. Robert P. Hartwig & Claire 
Wilkinson, Hurricane Katrina: The Five Year Anniversary 2 (Ins. Info. Inst. 2010), 
available at http://www.iii.org/sites/default/files/1007Katrina5Anniversary.pdf. 
30
 GAO, FLOOD INSURANCE, supra note 19, at 4. There is a small private insurance 
market that provides coverage for home values in excess of the ceiling under the 
NFIP. Id. 
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policies is statutorily capped at $350,000 for homeowners and $1 million 
for commercial property owners.
31
   
NFIP policies are subsidized, which means that the premiums 
collected are not sufficient to cover flood claims, and the deficit is 
passed on to the Treasury Department. As a result, the U.S. taxpayer is 
currently the reinsurer of truly catastrophic flood risks. And because 
NFIP policies are cheaper than flood insurance sold in the private 
market, they have come to dominate the flood risk market.
32
   
In addition to providing affordable flood coverage, the NFIP 
seeks to incentivize flood mitigation. To participate in the program and 
to entitle their residents to buy subsidized NFIP policies, communities 
are required adopt and enforce a floodplain management ordinance to 
reduce future flood risks to new construction. In these areas, new 
construction and substantial improvements must conform to NFIP’s 
building standards. For example, the lowest floor of a structure must be 
elevated to or above the “base flood elevation” — the level at which 
there is a 1 percent chance of flooding in a given year. 
While the rates charged by NFIP to its policyholders are based 
on flood maps that reflect the likelihood of floods in the different 
regions,
33
 the maps are often out of date.
34
 Even when the maps are 
                                                        
31
 Id. at 9. 
32
 According to a RAND study published in 2006, 49 percent of all SFHs in SFHAs 
had NFIP policies and another 1 to 3 percent had private policies.  LLOYD DIXON, 
NOREEN CLANCY, SETH A. SEABURY & ADRIAN OVERTON, RAND, THE 
NATIONAL FLOOD INSURANCE PROGRAM’S MARKET PENETRATION RATE: 
ESTIMATES AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS (2006), available at 
http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/technical_reports/2006/RAND_TR300
.sum.pdf.  
33
 National Flood Insurance Program, FED. EMERGENCY MGMT. AGENCY, 
http://www.fema.gov/national-flood-insurance-program-flood-hazard-mapping 
(last updated Oct. 23, 2014); Flooding and Flood Risks: Understanding Flood 
Maps, NAT’L FLOOD INS. PROGRAM, 
https://www.floodsmart.gov/floodsmart/pages/flooding_flood_risks/understanding_
flood_maps.jsp(last visited Nov. 6, 2014). 
34
 CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, PUB. NO. 4008, THE NATIONAL FLOOD INSURANCE 
PROGRAM: FACTORS AFFECTING ACTUARIAL SOUNDNESS 14 (), available at 
http://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/cbofiles/ftpdocs/106xx/doc10620/11-04-
floodinsurance.pdf; see also Theodoric Meyer, Using Outdated Data, FEMA is 
Wrongly Placing Homeowners in Flood Zones, PROPUBLICA (July 18, 2013, 12:07 
PM) http://www.propublica.org/article/using-outdated-data-fema-is-wrongly-
placing-homeowners-in-flood-zones.  Changes made by Biggert-Waters were 
supposed to improve the updating process. Id.; Scott Gabriel Knowles, Biggert-
Waters and NFIP: Flood Insurance Should Be Strengthened, Slate (March 23, 
2014, 11:47 PM), 
 -13- 
updated, there are cross-subsidies among insureds within the system and 
a substantial percentage of property owners in high-risk areas are 
deliberately asked to pay well below actuarial rates.
35
 The maps are 
politicized: attempts by FEMA to update them and base the premiums on 
more actuarially sound calculus meets political influence.
36
 As a result, 
currently the NFIP is operating at a massive deficit, estimated in 2014 to 
be around $24 billion.   
In response to this budget deficit and the concern that it might 
grow, lawmakers in 2012 enacted the so-called Biggert-Waters Flood 
Insurance Reform Act.
37
  Biggert-Waters sought to gradually eliminate 
the underfunding of the NFIP and curb the disturbing cross-subsidies 
built into the program.  For example, Biggert-Waters was going to phase 
out the subsidies entirely for certain “repetitive loss properties,” second 
homes, business properties, homes that have been substantially improved 
or damaged, and homes sold to new owners.  Biggert-Waters permitted 
much faster NFIP annual rate increases (25 percent annually, up from 
previous 10 percent cap), and required all premiums to be based on 
“average historical loss years,” including catastrophic loss years.  One of 
the most controversial aspects of the new law was the elimination of 
grandfathering for the many older buildings in high-risk areas.   
However, the backlash from property owners along coastal areas, 
where resulting premium increases were the greatest, was swift and 
effective.
38
 In some areas, there were reports of homeowners’ premiums 
rising tenfold.
39
  The concern expressed by many lawmakers, on behalf 
of their angry constituents, was that unless Biggert-Waters was repealed 
or at least delayed, they wouldn’t be able to remain in their homes or 
continue their small businesses.  Thus, before Biggert-Waters was able to 
take effect, Congress passed in 2014 the Homeowner Flood Insurance 
                                                                                                                                       
http://www.slate.com/articles/health_and_science/science/2014/03/biggert_waters_
and_nfip_flood_insurance_should_be_strengthened.html. 
35
 RAWLE O. KING, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42850, THE NATIONAL FLOOD 
INSURANCE PROGRAM: STATUS AND REMAINING ISSUES FOR CONGRESS 19–20 
(2013). 
36
 See Bill Dedman, FBI Investigates FEMA Flood Map Changes After NBC News 
Report, NBC NEWS (Mar. 27, 2014), 
http://www.nbcnews.com/news/investigations/fbi-investigates-fema-flood-map-
changes-after-nbc-news-report-n62906. 
37
 Pub. L. No. 112-141 §§ 100201–100261, 126 Stat. 405, 916–79 (2012). 
38
 Jenny Anderson, Outrage as Homeowners Prepare for Substantially Higher 
Flood Insurance Rates, N.Y. TIMES, July 29, 2013, at A12.  
39
 Thomas Ferraro, U.S. Senate Passes Bill to Delay Hikes in Flood Insurance 
Rates, REUTERS (Jan. 30, 2014), http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/01/30/us-usa-
insurance-flooding-idUSBREA0T1WK20140130. 
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Affordability Act (HFIAA)
40
, which significantly weakened the changes 
made by Biggert-Waters. The political pressure to repeal Biggert-Waters 
was so successful that even Representative Maxine Waters voted in 
support of repealing her own bill. As a result, the 2014 Act imposed 
tighter limits on yearly premium increases, reinstated the NFIP 
grandfathering provision, and preserved the discounted premiums for 
sold properties.  The new law also called on FEMA to keep premiums at 
no more than 1 percent of the value of the coverage. 
 
2. Florida’s Citizens Property Insurance Corporation 
The other example of large-scale government-sold insurance for 
weather risk is Florida’s Citizens Property Insurance Corporation 
(Citizens)—a state owned company that specializes in wind-damage (and 
other, multiple-peril) coverage for homeowners and businesses in 
Florida.  Wind damage, of course, is the largest element of weather risk 
covered by these policies, since flood damage, the other major weather 
peril, is already covered almost exclusively by the NFIP. Indeed, 
Citizens provides the vast majority of the wind insurance for properties 
on the coast of Florida; and in many high-risk coastal areas, Citizens is 
the only insurer in Florida offering wind policies.  The company collects 
premiums that are used to pay the losses covered under the policies, but, 
as with the NFIP, the premiums are far below what is necessary to cover 
the full risk.
41
 
At first glance, Citizens appears to price its wind coverage in the 
same way private insurers do.  Citizens begins by evaluating the risk of 
wind damage in particular areas, which consist of 150 geographic rating 
territories.  Citizens then gives each territory a particular rate that takes 
into account weather patterns, construction methods, and past losses in 
that area. These wind rates are set with the use of sophisticated computer 
modeling techniques, informed by data about hurricane patterns, and 
adjusted periodically based on new information and updated experience.  
These base rates are then used by Citizens to determine the 
individualized premium charged for individual policies. 
This rating methodology is identical to the approach followed by 
private insurers, with one big difference. Citizens’ premiums do not 
                                                        
40
 Pub. L. No. 113-89, 128 Stat. 1020 (2014). 
41
 FLA. COUNCIL OF 100 & FLA. CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, INTO THE STORM: 
FRAMING FLORIDA'S LOOMING PROPERTY INSURANCE CRISIS 1 (2010), available at 
http://www.flchamber.com/wp-
content/uploads/IntotheStorm_FramingFLLoomingPropertyInsuranceCrisis_Januay
r2010.pdf. 
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reflect the actuarial risk associated with each insured property.
42
 Several 
reasons help to explain the gap between true-risk and charged premiums.  
First, state regulations place limits on the extent to which premiums can 
be increased, even when premiums are priced below actual risks.  
Second, there is some cross-subsidization among the 150 territories at 
the level of rate-setting.
43
 Third, and most significantly, Citizens does 
not face the same budgetary constraints that private insurers do. If it falls 
short—if the premiums collected are not enough to pay for the wind 
damage it covers—Citizens can invoke an “assessment” process to cover 
the shortfall. As a result, some of the catastrophic wind risk posed by 
hurricanes is shifted from Citizens’ policyholders to Florida taxpayers. 
Under the assessment process, Citizens can secure emergency 
funding for catastrophic losses that exceed its own reserves, as well as its 
various sources of reinsurance, by imposing a tax not only on all 
Citizens’ policyholders but also on all insurance policyholders (including 
homeowners and car owners, among others) within the state.  Part of this 
assessment/tax is collected up front, and part is spread out over a number 
of years, until the deficit is paid.
44
  The net effect is that the premiums 
actually charged by Citizens to a policyholder for a given piece of 
property often do not reflect the full actuarial risk associated with that 
insured property.  Moreover, as we show in detail below, the subsidies 
are not allocated equally among Citizens’ policyholders.   
 
III. THE PERVERSE EFFECTS OF SUBSIDIZED WEATHER INSURANCE 
 
Part I reviewed the tools available to insurers in regulating 
weather risk. We saw that through differentiated premium, private 
insurance has the capacity to perform a social function that is regulatory 
in nature: better preparedness on the part policyholders and better 
decision making with respect to building location. Part II then explained 
                                                        
42
 In Citizens’ rate filings with the Florida Office of Insurance Regulation, the 
difference between the rate that would need to be charged to fully cover the risks 
insured by Citizens and the rate currently being charged is called the “indicated rate 
change.” Because of legislative and regulatory caps on the amount of annual 
premium increases, Citizens does not request actual rate increases equal to the 
indicated rate changes, at least not with respect to wind risk, where the gap between 
the actual rates and the indicated rates are the largest. Telephone interview with 
Daniel Sumner, General Counsel and Chief Legal Officer, Citizens Property 
Insurance Company (July 19, 2013) [hereinafter Sumner Interview]. 
43
 Sumner Interview. 
44
 Assessments, CITIZENS PROP. INS. CORP., 
https://www.citizensfla.com/about/CitizensAssessments.cfm (last visited Nov. 7, 
2014). 
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that much of the insurance for severe weather risk in the U.S is provided 
by the government, through a variety of federal and state programs. 
How well does government insurance perform as a regulator of 
weather risk? In particular, how does it fare relative to the performance 
of private insurance? Would it be better to outsource the regulatory role 
of severe weather preparedness to private insurance markets? 
Given the underdeveloped private market for weather insurance, 
which is largely the result of the existence of government insurance, we 
cannot line up the two institutions nose-to-nose and compare. Instead, we 
identify elements that are unique to government-provided insurance and 
evaluate their effects. These effects can then be compared with 
hypothetical private insurance patterns, given what is known about 
private insurance operation in other markets.  
The analysis below examines the government’s insurance 
performance along two normative metrics: fairness and efficiency. 
Section A examines the distributive effects of government insurance and 
tries to answer a question often left unasked: who are the beneficiaries of 
the implicit subsidies inherent in government insurance? Is it a 
progressive redistributive scheme? Section B examines the productive 
efficiency aspects of government insurance: how does it affect 
investment incentives? How does it affect total welfare? 
 
A. Distributive Effects 
Now, is this a bailout for the rich people? 
-- Representative Bill Cassidy (R-LA)
45
 
 
1. Insurance Cross-Subsidies: Who are the beneficiaries? 
Private insurance covers only premium-paying policyholders.  
That is how insurance markets work: risk-averse parties pay premiums to 
a privately managed fund that is contractually bound to cover certain 
specified losses if they occur.  In a competitive environment, the 
premiums insurers collect (minus administrative costs) must roughly 
equal the amount of the payouts.  It follows that private insurance cannot 
pay claims of victims who have not paid into the insurance pool.  It also 
cannot systematically undercharge some policyholders, because that 
would require an offsetting systematic overcharge of others. Those who 
are overcharged can be cherry-picked by competitors who can offer them 
better terms. In private insurance, most of the redistribution occurs 
                                                        
45
 160 CONG. REC. H60 (daily ed. Jan 8, 2014) (statement of Rep. Cassidy) (“Now, 
is this a bailout for rich people? The people in Louisiana who will benefit from 
reforming our current process . . . are working people. . . . These are not rich people 
insuring their vacation homes”). 
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within the pool of policyholders and only ex post—namely, from lucky 
non-victims to unlucky victims. Although all real-world private 
insurance pools involve some cross-subsidization from the less risky to 
the more risky, in the ideal case, if premiums are set according to the risk 
data, there is no ex ante cross-subsidy—no policyholder pays for an 
expected benefit that others enjoy disproportionately. 
By contrast, because government insurance is partially funded by 
general tax revenues, there is no actuarial budget constraint. In fact, 
government relief programs and insurance plans are specifically intended 
to create systematic transfers favoring residents of disaster areas. And 
unlike private insurance, government sold insurance can contain a 
systematic and intended discount to make its policies more affordable, 
and the deficit can be covered through the government’s general budget. 
Indeed, the unique feature of government insurance compared with 
private insurance, and the primary reason for establishing it, is precisely 
the creation of an ex ante cross-subsidy scheme.  
Such cross-subsidies obviously conflict with actuarial 
conceptions of fairness—charging every person who is covered by an 
insurance policy a premium equal to that person’s expected benefits 
under the policy (“to each according to her benefit”). Actuarial fairness 
has an intuitive appeal, for example, when differences in risks are the 
result of individuals’ voluntary choices. It seems fair that smokers should 
pay higher life and health insurance premiums than non-smokers, and 
that aggressive drivers pay higher auto insurance premiums. 
The cross-subsidy embodied in government insurance is an 
intended feature despite its violation of actuarial fairness, because it is 
thought to be fair and progressive. In the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, 
for example, Representative Barney Frank promoted increased funding 
to the NFIP because of “our moral duty to the poorest people and 
working people and lower middle income people.” 46  More recently, 
when Congress reinstated the subsidized flood insurance rates in 2014 
(after a previous bill sought to scale down the subsidies), the bill was 
pitched as a program favoring struggling homeowners.  It garnered 
bipartisan support (approved with a vote of 72-22 in the Senate) because 
cuts in subsidies “burdened lower- and middle-class homeowners and 
small businesses.”47 As the House voted down an amendment to the bill 
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 151 CONG. REC. H7760 (daily ed. Sept. 8, 2005) (statement of Rep. Barney 
Frank); see also Rep. Rick Lazio, Letter to the Editor, Flood Fund Aids Working-
Class Homeowners, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 18, 1993, A26.  
47
 160 CONG. REC. H56 (daily ed. Jan. 8, 2014) (statement of Rep. Marino) (calling 
for a blanket repeal of Biggert-Waters); Id. at H61 (statement of Rep. Scalise) 
(claiming that the increased premiums will fall disproportionately on hardworking 
“middle class families” who have never been flooded due to their own community-
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that would have removed retroactive reimbursements of high premiums 
to the owners of coastal vacation homes,
48
 representatives invoked 
progressive sentiments by alluding to anecdotal stories of the suffering of 
lower-class, middle-class, and senior citizens as a result of the previously 
enacted premium hikes. The subsidies, one Congressman said, will 
prevent working families, who are “doing everything they can to put 
food on the table,” from losing their homes. 49  As one of the Bill’s 
champions explained,  
“This is not about the millionaires in mansions on the 
beach. . . These are middle class, working people 
living in normal, middle class houses doing their best 
to raise their kids, contribute to their communities and 
make a living.”50 
These insurance subsidy schemes are appealing because the risk 
differences are thought to be arbitrary, not the result of voluntary choice. 
People suffering high risk of weather disasters are hardly at fault, their 
losses are often devastating, and their insurance premiums are financially 
crushing. Thus, when polled, even people who are not affected by flood 
insurance premium subsidies (but who, perhaps unbeknownst to them, 
pay taxes to fund them) strongly support the subsidies. In one survey, 
only 15% of unaffected Florida citizens supported the premium 
increases.
51
 The affordability concern, bolstered by a strong intuition that 
the beneficiaries of the subsidies are lower-middle income families, 
trumps the amorphous conception of actuarial fairness as a way to 
achieve distributive justice.  
The cross-subsidy created by government-sold insurance follows, 
then, a distinct logic: it moves from people lucky enough to live in safe 
areas (“the affluent”) to the less lucky residents living in low lying areas 
in storms’ paths (“the poor”). But this conjecture, that subsidized 
                                                                                                                                       
organized flood-safety measures); Id. at H2102 (daily ed. Mar. 4, 2014) (statement 
of Rep. Ros-Lehtinen) (claiming that the astronomical premiums are pushing the 
family budgets of working-class families to their breaking point);, Id. at E309 
(daily ed. Mar. 5, 2014) (statement of Rep. Castor) (“If this bill passes we will keep 
middle class families in their homes, bring relief to our local economy and provide 
needed reliability to middle class friends and neighbors.”). 
48
 Id. at S1627 (daily ed. Mar. 13, 2014) (statement of Sen. Lee). 
49
 See, e.g., Id. at S581 (daily ed. Jan. 29, 2014) (Statement of Sen. Heitkamp). 
50
 Id. at S1631 (daily ed. Mar. 13, 2014) (statement of Sen. Landrieu). 
51
 Jeff Harrington, Poll: Opposition to Flood Insurance Rate Hikes is Strong, 
TAMPA BAY TIMES, Dec 24, 2013, 
http://www.tampabay.com/news/business/banking/poll-opposition-to-flood-
insurance-rate-hikes-is-strong/2158508. 
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weather insurance benefits the less affluent, has not been fully tested.
52
 
We believe that it is wrong and that the opposite is true: the subsidy 
accrues primarily to the affluent. This for a simple reason: those who 
need flood insurance most are the habitants of properties build in 
proximity to the coast, where severe weather strikes most forcefully. 
Because properties adjacent to the coast are in general (putting weather 
risk to one side) more desirable and more expensive, the beneficiaries of 
the subsidies are not the poor but the affluent.
53
 
If in fact the high-risk beachfront owners are, all else equal, 
wealthier, they are less deserving of means-based government subsidies. 
Moreover, any form of government-subsidized insurance—disaster relief 
or contractual policies—is funded through general tax revenues, coming 
from middle income taxpayers living mostly inland in lower-valued 
homes (or, as we saw, from assessments on drivers buying auto 
insurance). To the extent that high-income owners of beachfront property 
are the primary beneficiaries of this government insurance scheme, and 
to the extent that the cross-subsidy is disproportionately funded by the 
                                                        
52
 Relatively few studies of the distributional effects of government-provided 
weather insurance have been done. They focused on premiums collected and claim 
payments in connection with the NFIP program, and have come to a different 
conclusion. One study concluded that “[t]axpayer-subsidized NFIP claims 
…represent a significant wealth transfer from middle-income counties to relatively 
wealthy and poor counties.”  J. Scott Holladay & Jason A. Schwartz, Flooding the 
Market: The Distributional Consequences of the NFIP, POL’Y BR. NO. 7, N.Y.U. 
INST. FOR POL’Y INTEGRITY at 5 (2010), available online at 
http://policyintegrity.org/documents/FloodingtheMarket.pdf.  Another study found 
“no evidence that the NFIP disproportionally advantages richer counties.” Bin et al, 
supra note __.  Both studies looked at county level NFIP premium, payout, and 
income data, and thus were not able to pick up within county effects: Are the rich 
within a county subsidizing the poor within a county, or the reverse?  Our study 
includes individual insurance-policy level data, thus capturing redistributive effects 
with greater precision. . 
53
 Holladay & Schwartz made a similar prediction: 
Beach front communities typically exhibit strong income gradients 
moving inland from the beach.  The most expensive homes are 
those directly on the beach, followed by homes with a view of the 
ocean, then those within walking distance of the ocean, and finally 
those homes without easy access to the water. The value of property 
can often drop quickly with increased distance from the ocean. This 
income gradient is highly correlated and inversely related to the risk 
of flooding in those regions.   
Holladay and Schwartz, supra note __, at 5, citing Christopher Major, The Beach 
Study: An Empirical Analysis of the Distribution of Coastal Property Values 
(2003) and CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, PUB. NO. 2807, VALUE OF PROPERTIES IN THE 
NATIONAL FLOOD INSURANCE PROGRAM (2007), available at 
http://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/cbofiles/ftpdocs/82xx/doc8256/06-25-
floodinsurance.pdf [hereinafter CBO, VALUE OF PROPERTIES].   
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less affluent inland-residing taxpayers and policyholders, it represents a 
regressive form of redistribution. And, as a matter of public choice, the 
more the government has to bail out its under-capitalized insurance fund, 
the less tax revenue remains to spend on other, more progressive 
programs. 
We wish to test the regressive redistribution hypothesis, and we 
do so in two ways. First, we examine the distribution of subsidies under 
Florida’s Citizens insurance. We begin with this scheme because we 
have data about actual prices and subsidies, which allows us to measure 
directly the direction of the redistribution. Second, we return to the NFIP 
and point to some indirect evidence regarding the direction of 
redistribution. Together, these observations suggest that government 
weather insurance has unappreciated but substantial regressive effects. 
 
2. Redistribution under Florida’s Citizens Property Insurance  
 
The state subsidized the well-to-do who live near 
the beach at the expense of the less-well-to-do 
who don’t. 
 — Michael Lewis, New York Times54 
 
a. Citizens’ data and some initial observations 
Citizens sells wind-peril insurance policies to homeowners in 
every part of Florida. As mentioned, the policies are priced according to 
the wind territory in which the insured property is located, of which there 
are 150. Prices are adjusted annually and have to be approved by the 
state Office of Insurance Regulation. Statutory and regulatory caps limit 
the extent to which Citizens can raise its rates in any given year. 
As discussed above, Citizens’ actual insurance premiums are 
known—and intended to be—different than the “true risk” premiums 
(those representing an actuarially accurate methodology). For every 
calendar year, Citizens publishes charts listing, for each individual 
policy, the actual premium and the true risk hypothetical premium, 
allowing a straightforward calculation of the subsidy each policy 
receives. In 2012, there were 527,250 individual policies. This is the 
“policy level data.” In addition, because policies are rated and priced 
based on the risk territory in which they are sold, and because all policies 
within a given territory enjoy the same proportional subsidy, some of the 
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 Michael Lewis, In Nature’s Casino, N.Y. TIMES MAGAZINE, Aug. 26, 2007, at 
51, available at  
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/08/26/magazine/26neworleans-t.html. 
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information can be analyzed by comparing patterns across territories. For 
that, we used aggregated “territory-level data.”55  
To get a general sense of the subsidy picture, we looked initially 
at the territory-level data. Here, in publicly available rate filings, Citizens 
publishes summaries for each of the 150 risk territories, showing the 
total sum of premiums paid by policyholders in that territory, as well as 
the “indicated” rate change, that is, how much more (or less) the 
company would have needed to charge policyholders in that territory to 
break even actuarially. Here is an example:
56
 
 
Territory Name Wind Premium Indicated Rate 
Change 
Monroe $38,582,378 126.5% 
Hillsborough, Exc. Tampa $19,496,173 25.9% 
Pinellas – Saint Petersburg $29,059,878 14.7% 
Broward (Excl. Hllwd & Ft. 
Ldrdle) 
$70,297,604 -12.5% 
Broward (Wind 47) $27,847,251 57.3% 
Broward (Wind 48) $21,530,419 17.3% 
 
In Monroe territory, for example, where some of the south 
Florida keys are located, the premiums actually collected by Citizens 
total $38,582,378, but they fall short of Citizens’ estimate of the 
expected risk. To be precise, an increase of 126.5% in the premium 
charged to each policy in that territory would be necessary to cover the 
shortfall. In Tampa’s suburbs or in Saint Petersburg, the shortfall in 
premiums is more modest, 25.9% and 14.7%, respectively. Many of the 
highly populated Florida areas, such as Broward County where Ft. 
Lauderdale is located, are divided into several risk territories. As the 
chart above shows, some of these territories, like the one labeled Wind 
47, receive a substantial subsidy (57.3% above the actual cost); others, 
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like Wind 48, receive a modest subsidy (17.3%); and some are actually 
overcharged and receive a negative subsidy.
57
 
Since there are 150 territories and they vary greatly by the 
amount of subsidies they receive, we wanted to see if any pattern might 
be discerned. To that end, we created a map of Florida by risk territories 
and colored each territory according to the magnitude of the subsidy it 
receives. The darker the shade of green, the higher the subsidy 
represented on the map: 
Figure 3 Here 
Figure 3 shows a remarkable but predictable pattern. Coastal 
territories, almost without exception, enjoy large percentage subsidies, 
whereas inland territories receive smaller subsidies, if they receive any 
subsidy at all.  A similar relationship can be seen when we zoom in and 
look at densely populated South Florida: 
Figure 4 Here 
The pattern is even clearer here: the subsidies are larger in 
territories very close to the water. Figures 1 and 2 also help us begin to 
speculate about a possible relation between subsidy and wealth, since 
water proximity is often a feature attracting wealthy home buyers.
58
 To 
visualize this, we plotted on the subsidy maps the location of the highest 
and lowest wealth concentrations. Red dots mark territories in which the 
median home value is at least three standard deviations above the 
statewide median.
59
 Blue dots mark areas more than one standard 
deviation below median home value. No surprise: wealthy households 
are located in the high subsidy (deep green) territories. Poor households 
are located more often in the low- or no-subsidy territories. 
These maps reflect the territory-based data, comparing the 
treatment of the 150 different insurance risk territories. Eventually, we 
would like to test if the distribution of subsidies is indeed correlated with 
the distribution of wealth. To do so, we needed more information about 
policyholders’ wealth. We used two sources: 
(i) Household Value: Citizens’ policy-level data do not include 
home values, but they do list the zip codes of the insured properties. 
Thus, we were able to use publicly available information about median 
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household value within the zip code in which the insured property is 
located.
60
  
(ii) Coverage Limit: Citizens’ policy level data include an entry 
for the amount of insurance purchased under each policy. Since 
insurance law does not allow the purchase of coverage exceeding the 
value of the property, we can use the coverage amount as an estimate of 
the lower bound of the property’s value. This will help us test whether 
people who own lower-valued homes receive a greater or smaller 
insurance subsidy.
61
 
To further visualize the relation between subsidy and wealth, we 
used the zip-code-level household value data. For each zip code, we 
know the median household value, and we computed the average dollar 
value subsidy for all Citizens’ policies issued in that zip code, taken from 
Citizens policy-level data. When we did this for all 904 Florida zip 
codes, we got the following scatter plot:  
 
Figure 5 Here 
 
The trend line is positive, suggesting that zip codes with higher 
valued homes receive higher per-policy subsidies. 
A similar picture emerges if we look at policy level data and ask 
whether high-value policies (those attached to high-value homes) receive 
a higher or lower subsidy. We divided Citizens’ policies into five 
quintiles according to the policy coverage amount. For each quintile, we 
calculated the average subsidy. Again, we see a clear picture: higher 
quintiles of wealth get a higher absolute subsidy:  
 
Figure 6 Here 
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b. Empirical Analysis 
In order to measure the disproportionate benefit of the insurance 
subsidy to the affluent, we used Citizens’ policy level data. For each 
policy, we looked at two measures of subsidy. First, we looked at the 
straightforward “absolute subsidy” which is the difference between the 
premium charged and the hypothetical premium reflecting full risk. 
Since Citizens reports the “indicated rate change” necessary to bring the 
actual premium to the full risk level, this absolute subsidy for each 
policy is simply the premium  charged for that policy times the indicated 
rate change for that policy. 
But the absolute subsidy may tell an incomplete story. A $300 
subsidy for a low-coverage policy of, say, $50,000, may be a relatively 
more significant factor than a $500 subsidy for a high-coverage policy of 
$500,000. We therefore wanted to measure the relative subsidy each 
policy is getting. To do this, we created a synthetic benchmark in which 
the subsidy pool (the total amount of subsidy for all policies within the 
dataset) is divided pro rata across the policies, under the (counterfactual) 
assumption that all policies receive the same indicated rate change—the 
same percent discount. We denoted this benchmark as a “unit subsidy,” 
with all policies receiving exactly one unit. We then compared this unit-
subsidy benchmark with the actual percent discount each policy 
received. This created a distribution of “percent subsidies,” some 
receiving more than the unit benchmark, others receiving less. We 
measured whether this “percent subsidy” distribution was correlated with 
household wealth. Wealth, recall, is measured in our estimates in two 
different ways: coverage limit under the policy and median zip code 
household value. 
We estimated two regression models: 
 
LogAbsoluteSubsidyi = α + β LogWealthi + εi 
 
PercentSubsidyi = α + β LogWealthi + εi 
 
The first model examines how increase in wealth correlates with 
the absolute subsidy. A one percent increase in wealth is associated with 
a β percent increase in the absolute subsidy. If β is positive, there is 
positive correlation between wealth and subsidy and the government’s 
program is regressive. Table 1 presents our findings.  
The results are statistically significant and demonstrate a 
significant correlation between wealth and subsidy. Column (1) in Table 
1 shows that a one percent increase in the Coverage variable is 
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associated with a 1.052 percent increase in the subsidy. Simply put, if 
property A is worth twice as much as property B, and thus the owner of 
property A purchases coverage that is 100 percent greater than the 
coverage purchased by the owner of property B, the owner of A enjoys 
on average a 105 percent higher absolute subsidy. Columns (2)–(4) 
repeat this test, and obtain the same result, with fixed effects for policy, 
standard errors clustered by territory, and both. Column (5) uses a 
different independent variable to measure wealth – the average 
household value within the insured home’s zip code (“Log HH Value”). 
The wealth coefficient is smaller, 0.484 percent (predictably, given the 
use of average wealth measures).
62
  
The second model examines the relation between wealth and our 
generated synthetic variable of “percent subsidy.” The results are 
presented in table 2. 
Again, the subsidy is strongly correlated with wealth. A one 
percent increase in household value is associated with either a 0.847 
percent or 0.571 percent increase in percent subsidy, depending on how 
we measure wealth, and the results are again highly significant. 
c. Discussion 
The results reported above show that the wind insurance 
subsidies within policies sold by Citizens Property Insurance Company 
accrue disproportionately to affluent households, and the magnitude of 
this regressive redistribution is substantial. While we are unable to 
measure directly the wealth of policyholders, we showed that people 
who buy higher coverage (namely, who own more expensive homes), or, 
alternatively, people who live in wealthier zip codes, receive larger 
subsidies, both in absolute magnitude and as a percent of their premium. 
The estimates we derived for the correlation between wealth and 
subsidy probably understate the true magnitude of the pro-affluent 
advantage. First, one of our measures of wealth—policy coverage 
limit—is capped by Citizens’ rules, which means that we are not 
measuring the true wealth of the people who buy maximal coverage, and 
are therefore deriving downward-biased correlations. Second, Citizens’ 
report of the subsidies—the indicated rate changes—understates the 
subsidies’ true magnitude. Citizens does not take into account some of 
the costs of providing insurance—costs that private insurers would incur 
in running an insurance scheme. Specifically, when Citizens calculates 
the amount of the indicated rate change, it does not build into it the cost 
of reinsurance—an insurance reserve necessary to protect it against the 
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risk of pricing errors or unexpected spikes in losses.  Citizens does not 
need require such a reserve, because of its power in effect to tax the 
citizenry or to assess all insurance purchasers in the state of Florida.   
We have not tried to identify the causal story underlying this 
correlation, nor are we interested in its direction. Causation may go 
either way: greater wealth may help people secure greater subsidies; or 
greater subsidies may help people move into more expensive homes. We 
are not interested in causation because the troubling feature of the system 
has nothing to do with any causal theory. The problem is the large 
positive correlation between wealth and subsidy, a correlation that 
conflicts with the goals and underlying rhetoric justifying the program. 
 
3. Redistribution under the NFIP 
As we saw in Part II, the NFIP insures over 5 million properties, 
up to $350,000 per residential property. The program is not designed to 
be financially balanced. In fact, subsidized rates were thought by 
lawmakers to be an inducement for communities to participate in the 
program and adopt flood mitigation requirements for buildings and 
floodplains management. 
Although in most years the NFIP collects enough premiums to 
cover each year’s claims, a few catastrophic events more than wipe out 
the NFIP’s reserves. Currently, in 2014, the NFIP’s debt exceeds $24 
billion. Present rate-setting practices are “unlikely to be able to cover the 
program’s claims, expenses, and debt, exposing the federal government 
and ultimately taxpayers to ever-greater financial risks, especially in 
years of catastrophic flooding.”63 
As a result of the discounts, people insured by the NFIP pay only 
a fraction of the full-risk premium. In 2006, FEMA estimated this 
fraction to be 35–40 percent. The subsidy is, on average, close to two-
thirds of the economic cost. An average premium charged by the NFIP 
was $721, but would cost between $1800–$2060 if priced to cover full 
risk.
64
 In the highest flood risk areas, the fraction of full risk paid by 
policyholders is even lower.
65
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A 2007 report by the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) found 
that “properties covered under the NFIP tend to be more valuable than 
other properties nationwide.” At the time, the median value of a home in 
the U.S. was $160,000; the median value estimated for homes insured by 
the NFIP ranged from $220,000 to $400,000. The CBO found that 
“much of the difference is attributable to the higher property values in 
area that are close to water.”66 There are 130 million homes in the U.S, 
but only a small fraction of them receive subsidized NFIP policies. Of 
those who do, nearly 80 percent are located in counties that rank in the 
wealthiest quintile.
67
 
Despite the image—often invoked in political debates over flood 
insurance
68 —of the subsidy going to struggling middle-class 
homeowners who have lived for generations in floodplains, the reality is 
different. “40 percent of the subsidized coast properties in the sample are 
worth more than $500,000; 12 percent are worth more than $1 
million.” 69  These are far higher proportions than in the rest of the 
country. For inland properties (the great majority of which do not 
purchase flood insurance) only 15 percent are worth more than $500,00 
and only 3 percent more than $1million.  
The myth of the subsidized struggling homeowner is further 
dispelled by another striking fact: 23 percent of subsidized coastal 
properties are not the policyholders’ principal residence—they are either 
vacation homes or year-round rentals. Indeed, these subsidized second 
homes in coastal areas are generally higher in value than the subsidized 
principal residences in the same coastal areas ($634,000 versus 
$530,000).
70
 Thus, even among the group of beneficiaries who live along 
the coast and who disproportionately enjoy the subsidy, second-homers 
are the bigger gainers from the subsidy. 47 percent of the subsidized 
homes that are not principal residences are worth more than $500,000 
(and 15 percent worth more than $1 million).
71
 
Another indication that wealthier households enjoy the NFIP 
subsidy is the fraction of homes that purchase the maximum coverage. 
Low-value homes owned by lower income residents do not need (and are 
ineligible for) the maximum coverage; high-value homes do. In 2002, 
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only 11 percent of NFIP policies were at maximum limit. By 2012, the 
fraction increased to 42 percent, with most of these high-coverage homes 
located in the Gulf Coast and Eastern Coast states. For example, in New 
York (with a median home value of $285,300), 65 percent of its 
policyholders had the maximum coverage. In contrast, in West Virginia 
(a median home value of $99,300), only 7 percent of its policyholders 
had maximum coverage.
72
 
Finally, the benefit to coastal areas, which tend to have higher 
property value, accrues in another less direct way. Participation in the 
NFIP requires communities to develop floodplain management plans. 
Such investments reduce flood risk and increase the land available for 
new construction. In effect, the “NFIP, by serving as a backstop for those 
risks, favors development in communities with floodplains, by shifting 
some of those risks onto taxpayers.”73 
 
B. Investment Distortions 
 
In Section A we asked whether government insurance produces 
the desirable distributive effects aspired by its political proponents, of 
improving affordability among lower income residents of floodplains. 
We saw that the opposite is true—that the benefits of the program flow 
disproportionately to the affluent. We now turn to examine another 
troubling distortion of the existing government insurance programs: the 
effect on total welfare. 
 
1. Regulation of Location 
In choosing the location of development (and redevelopment), 
people have to estimate the perils of particular sites. Coastal areas are 
attractive for many salient reasons, which feature prominently in buyers’ 
calculations. The downside—exposure to severe storms—is recognized 
in the abstract, but hard to quantify.  
Insurance, if priced accurately, provides an important service of 
quantifying the risk and helping people trade it off against the upsides. 
This is a general (desirable) feature of insurance, operating in effect like 
a Pigouvian tax in internalizing an otherwise overlooked cost.
74
 Knowing 
the expected cost of exposure to weather disaster, people are more likely 
to make an informed cost-benefit calculation in choosing locations. 
Subsidized insurance rates destroy the information value of full-risk 
premiums, thus suppressing the true cost of living in severe weather 
                                                        
72
 GAO-13-568, FLOOD INSURANCE, supra note 19, at 10–12. 
73
 Holladay & Schwartz, supra note __. 
74
 See Ben-Shahar & Logue, supra note 9, at 229–31. 
 -29- 
zones, and creating an excessive incentive to populate attractive but 
dangerous locations. It is a moral hazard problem occurring at the 
dimension of the activity level. 
We saw that the NFIP charges subsidized premiums deliberately 
to make insurance affordable.
75
 This intent was punctuated by the 
enactment of the so-called Homeowner Flood Insurance Affordability 
Act of 2014, which scaled back premium increases that intended to 
eliminate the subsidies. But there are additional, unintentional causes for 
the inaccurate premiums set by the NFIP. First, the data it relies on in 
drawing flood maps is outdated.  Despite the efforts to update and 
modernize the maps, the long lapses between such adjustments are 
indicative of the inadequate political or financial incentives to run an 
actuarially accurate system. For example, Hurricane Sandy exposed the 
inadequacy of FEMA’s old flood maps and led to an updating of high-
risk areas. Under the new maps, “a $429 annual premium on a structure 
previously outside the high-risk zone could well rise to $5000 to $10,000 
for the same amount of coverage if it is inside the high-risk area.”76  
Second, the NFIP charges subsidized premiums because it allows 
certain properties to maintain their previous historically low rates, 
despite data showing a greater risk. FEMA does not even collect data on 
these grandfathered properties to measure their financial impact on the 
program and does not even keep track of how many of these properties 
there are. Further, the agency sets flood insurance rates on a nationwide 
basis using rough averages, which means that many factors relevant to 
flood risk are not specifically accounted for in rating individual 
properties. Normally such crude averaging would lead to adverse 
selection and unraveling, as low-risk properties should prefer to exit and 
join separate pools with actuarially fair policies, rather than subsidize 
other neighborhoods. But if the government subsidy is deep enough, it 
can offset this effect. Finally, as a government report conceded, 
“FEMA’s rate-setting process also does not fully take into account 
ongoing and planned development, long-term trends in erosion, or the 
effects of global climate change, although private sector models are 
incorporating some of these factors.”77 
Underpricing of flood insurance in coastal areas has long been 
associated with (and likely contributed to) excessive private development 
of flood zones. As the same Congressional report concluded, “FEMA . . . 
is unable, through its rate-setting process, to inform policyholders of the 
risk to their property from erosion. Consequently, in some cases flood 
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insurance rates may send a false signal that understates the risk exposure 
faced by current policyholders or prospective development.”78 And in 
writing about Florida’s Citizens wind insurance scheme, writer Michael 
Lewis explains that Florida “sold its citizens catastrophe insurance at 
roughly one-sixth the market rates, thus encouraging them to live in 
riskier places than they would if they had to pay what the market 
charged.”79 
Whether climate change is indeed causing a more severe pattern 
of catastrophic storms may still be debated.
80
 It is clear that the costs of 
hurricanes, for example, have increased dramatically over the past 
generation. But strikingly, much of the upward trend in storm loss data, 
after careful adjustment for societal factors, can be explained not by 
weather fluctuations but rather by increased concentration of property in 
dangerous areas, namely—by human decisions to locate more densely in 
the storms’ paths.  “The major cause of trends in losses related to 
weather and climate extremes is societal factors: the growth of wealth 
with more valuable property at risk, increasing density of property, and 
demographic shifts to coastal areas and storm-prone areas that are 
experiencing increasing urbanization.”81  
Indeed, according to the U.S. Census Bureau the number of 
people living in coastal areas in Florida increased by ten million people, 
almost fourfold, between 1960 and 2008. Coastal exposure now 
represents 79 percent of all property exposure in Florida, with an insured 
value of $2.8 trillion (in 2012).
82
 Major hurricanes did nothing to stop 
this migration. It is estimated that since Hurricane Andrew struck the 
Florida coast in 1992, development more than doubled the property 
value on its path. The $25 billion in total economic losses in 1992 
“would have resulted in more than twice that amount—$55 billion—
were it to have occurred in 2005, given current asset values” (even 
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holding constant the value of building material, real estate, and other 
societal changes).
83
 
The effects of climate change on weather patterns are only 
beginning to be understood, but private insurers are rushing to take these 
emerging patterns into account, adjusting premiums in light of near 
future projections, and studying potential industry-wide impacts and 
strategies to proactively address the rising risk.
84
 FEMA, on the other 
hand, “has done little to develop the kind of information needed to 
understand the long-term exposure of NFIP to climate change for a 
variety of reasons. NFIP’s risk management processes adapt to near-term 
changes in weather as they affect existing data. As a result, NFIP is 
designed to assess and insure against current—not future—risks and 
currently does not have the information necessary to adjust rates for the 
potential impacts of events associated with climate.”85 If, indeed, climate 
change poses increased risks of flood and erosion to low lying coastal 
zones, the failure of government insurance to price the risk into present 
policies exacerbates the overdevelopment problem.  
An independent report of erosion rates and their financial impact 
found that over the next sixty years, erosion may claim one out of four 
houses within 500 feet of the U.S. shoreline, as the following picture 
illustrates:
86
 
 
Figure 7 Here 
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However, the NFIP does not map erosion hazard and does not 
incorporate it into the insurance rate. As a result, rates are set at 
approximately half of actuarially accurate rates.  “Despite facing higher 
risk, homeowners in erosion-prone areas currently are paying the same 
amount for flood insurance as are policyholders in non-eroding areas.”87 
Not only will erosion claims have to be subsidized, but present insurance 
rates are also “misleading to users” because they do not inform 
homeowners of the erosion risk. As a result, the report finds that 
development in erosion areas is excessive. “In the absence of insurance 
and other programs to reduce flood risk, development density would be 
about 25 percent lower in the highest-risk zones than in areas less 
susceptible to damage from coastal flooding.”88 
The effect of the government insurance subsidy on homeowners’ 
location decisions can be further captured by the following finding. In 
some of the areas closest to the shoreline, annual rates have to be set at a 
whopping $11.40 per $100 of coverage to meet the risk projections—
over 10 percent of property value each year! At the same time, a survey 
of homeowners found that participation in insurance schemes with such 
high premiums would be “quite low”— about half of flood policyholders 
are only willing to pay up to $1–$2/year per $100 of coverage.89 
Not surprisingly, given the substantial subsidy provided by NFIP 
insurance and the increased development along coastal areas, the number 
of policies issued by the NFIP increased in the past generation from 1.9 
million to over 4.6 million.
90
 Some of these policyholders have lived in 
the area long before the NFIP. But many are newcomers, representing a 
repopulation enterprise facilitated by distorted insurance contracts. Many 
of these newcomers would not have moved to their present high-risk 
location, or would not have paid the same top dollar, in the absence of 
subsidized premiums. Indeed, one of the major complaints of existing 
homeowners against the Biggert-Waters Act of 2012 (which, recall, 
dramatically scaled back the NFIP subsidies) was their inability to afford 
the new premiums and how the new premiums were scaring away 
potential buyers and making mortgage loans unaffordable.
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2. Regulation of Precautions 
Insurance contracts affect not only the scope of activity, but also 
the level of care taken by policyholders. Auto insurance, for example, 
can induce people to drive more carefully (through experience rating); 
environmental liability insurance can induce firms to install spill 
prevention measures; and fire insurance can induce proprietors to invest 
in sprinklers.
92
 How does government insurance of weather risk perform 
as a risk mitigation mechanism? Historically, not very well.  As 
discussed above, the flood maps used by FEMA to administer the NFIP 
are notoriously out of date.  And even when they are up to date, the 
premiums are heavily subsidized for many properties in the highest risk 
areas, giving little incentive to install loss reducing measures.   
This situation seemed to be changing after the enactment of 
Biggert-Waters in 2012, as rapid premium increases began to induce 
behavioral changes on the part of property owners.  Under the new maps 
that were to be used, the affordability of insurance depended upon, 
among other things, how high one’s home was built above certain 
expected flood levels.  Homeowners rebuilding in New York, New 
Jersey, and Connecticut following Hurricane Sandy were induced to 
invest in stilts, raising their homes above the base flood elevation.
93
 
Whether this trend will continue now that Biggert-Waters has been cut 
back remains to be seen. 
Compared to flood mitigation, the role of government insurance 
in encouraging wind mitigation is perhaps more encouraging, although it 
is difficult to know for certain.  In Florida, for example, Citizens 
provides discounts to any of its policyholders who can demonstrate that 
the property they are insuring meets a list of highly detailed design 
specifications.
94
 Indeed, in Florida all insurers—private and public—are 
required by statute to provide such discounts.
95
  Because wind mitigation 
discounts in Florida are a matter of statutory mandate, it is impossible to 
determine what sorts of wind mitigation discounts a private insurer, 
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absence such a mandate, would be willing to provide.  A similar picture 
can be seen in other coastal states.
96
  For this reason, it is difficult to 
document a “care level” advantage on the part of private insurers with 
respect to coastal wind mitigation.   
It is easy to see, however, the considerable “activity level” 
advantage that private insurance has over government insurance of 
coastal weather risk.  If private insurers were permitted to charge what 
the market would bear for coastal weather risk (and were not limited by 
state insurance regulators), the prices would be considerably higher than 
they currently are, especially for the riskiest communities living close to 
water.  This claim is supported by anecdotal evidence.
97
  It is supported 
by the short experience of rate hikes under the Biggert-Waters Act, 
which “scared the bejesus out of people.” 98   And it is supported by 
Citizens data, where the subsidies for coastal wind insurance reflect the 
difference between what Citizens actually charges for such risks and 
what an actuarially accurate insurance premium would be.  
 
IV. RESPONDING TO CONCERNS ABOUT MARKET FAILURES IN PRIVATE 
WEATHER INSURANCE 
 
Insurance for weather risk is subsidized by the government. 
Either through disaster relief or through individually purchased insurance 
policies, people living in the zone of disaster pay only a fraction of the 
expected cost. It is a subsidy program with great political support, resting 
on a popular belief that it is both fair and efficient. This article showed 
that both perceptions are wrong. In delivering a subsidy that private 
insurance does not give, government insurance inflicts two distortions: 
regressive redistribution and inefficient investment in residential 
property. These distortions are not inherent to the function of insurance. 
They can be attenuated, and perhaps solved, by a return to private 
insurance markets. 
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In the course of developing this argument—the comparative 
performance of government versus private insurance—one cannot 
overlook the primary rationale for government takeover of weather risk 
insurance: market penetration. The argument is straightforward: when 
insurance is provided through a relief fund or with significant subsidies, 
coverage can extend beyond what private insurance markets provide, and 
resolve the markets failures of private insurance. Weather risk, it is 
alleged, is one such circumstance.  In this section, we examine the 
concern for market failures in the provision of private insurance. 
One possible concern with private insurance for weather risk is 
underinsurance. Due to cognitive failures, homeowners buy too little 
coverage.
99
 For example, it is estimated that only 20% of homeowners in 
high flood risk areas in New York City who are not required to purchase 
insurance actually purchase coverage, even at subsidized rates.
100
 
However, severe weather is an odd area for such an argument to be 
made. Surely people notice reports about weather disasters. If anything, 
they tend to be overly salient relative to other insured risks (thus 
triggering a salience bias). Indeed, it is estimated that for every person 
who dies in a storm, 140 people must die from famine to receive the 
same expected media coverage.
101
 
What is less surprising, perhaps, is the failure of homeowners to 
recognize that standard homeowners insurance policies exclude flood-
caused damage. Since much of the destruction due to severe weather is 
flood-related, it is excluded and offered as a separate contractual add-on. 
Notwithstanding mandated disclosures that alert people and remind them 
to purchase separate flood insurance, it is questionable whether such 
warnings appended to complex preprinted insurance policies could 
successfully inform people.
102
 The resulting gap in coverage is a market 
failure that government insurance can step in to correct. And yet, a more 
modest intervention can resolve this problem. Instead of being the 
provider of insurance, the government can simply mandate flood 
insurance in areas where some costs are otherwise shifted to the public 
(as it does for homes with federally guaranteed mortgage loans). The 
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mandate would usher people to insurance markets, without the need for 
government subsidy of policies. 
An alternative to mandating the purchase of flood or wind 
insurance at the consumer level would be to mandate that all property 
policies include coverage for flood damage. Currently, insurers insert 
exclusions for flood- or hurricane-caused damage, and these exclusions 
would be prohibited.  Such lumping of flood coverage into the standard 
homeowners policy would counteract problems of cognitive failure on 
the part of insurance purchasers, create demand for weather-related 
coverage (which would cause investment capital to flow into the 
weather-reinsurance market), and eliminate the social costs of litigating 
over whether a particular loss is caused by wind or water or whatever.
103
 
And to the extent that the price of such inclusive policies would become 
unaffordable to low-income homeowners, targeted means-tested 
subsidies or vouchers could be offered.
104
 
A potential limitation of private insurance as weather-risk 
regulation involves the standard time period over which property 
insurance is written. Property policies in the U.S. are sold and priced on 
an annual basis, which means the property insurer is obligated to cover 
losses sustained to the insured property during the year of coverage. As a 
result, individual property insurers may have insufficient incentives to 
invest in identifying the most effective risk-reducing strategies, as some 
portion of the benefits of these investments will redound to the benefit of 
future insurers.
105
 This effect is reduced when insurers pool resources 
industry-wide to engage in weather-risk research.  It could also be 
counteracted if property insurance policies were sold as long-term (ten-
year or even twenty-year) contracts, similar to home mortgages, which 
“run with the property.”106 That insurers do not presently offer multi-
year polices is of course not evidence that such policies are inefficient, 
given the cross-time collective action problem already mentioned, and 
the usurpation of the market by government provided policies. 
Another concern with private insurance for weather risk is the 
capacity to insure mega-disasters. Weather-related risks are commonly 
regarded as only partially insurable because of the problem of risk 
correlation. It is conventional wisdom that private insurance markets will 
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fail to perform their risk-spreading function when the insured risks are 
correlated with each other—when too many of the members of the 
insurance pool face the same risk and incur their loss in the same 
circumstances.
107
 That a number of insurers became insolvent in the 
aftermath of major hurricanes reinforces the notion that the most extreme 
cases of severe weather are just too big for private insurance to handle 
alone.  
But is that in fact true?  Is extreme weather risk actually 
uninsurable through private markets?  At least since the 1990s, after the 
Northridge Earthquake and Hurricane Andrew disasters exposed the 
inadequacy of capital that was then being deployed in catastrophe 
reinsurance markets, concerns have been expressed about the “capacity” 
of private markets to handle the once-in-a-generation disaster.
108
  In 
theory, it is not clear why even the largest storms should not be 
insurable, given the amount of capital available in the world to provide a 
hedge against such risks.  Even large correlated risks on the local or 
national level are uncorrelated and manageable, in terms of risk 
spreading, on a global level.  This is what reinsurance markets do: they 
take the risks insured by individual insurance companies around the 
world, pool them together, and then distribute them across investors 
worldwide.  So why are so few assets allocated to catastrophe 
reinsurance markets? 
A range of explanations have been offered for the apparent 
shortage of reinsurance capital, including tax incentives, agency costs, 
and exploitation of market power.
109
  At the same time, insurance 
markets have responded with a wave of financial innovation designed to 
increase the market’s supply of catastrophic reinsurance capacity. 110  
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One of the most promising developments in building capital reserves for 
mega-catastrophes has occurred in securities markets—the development 
of the catastrophic bond (“cat bond”).   
Cat bonds are tradable debt securities issued by insurers. They 
are sold to investors in capital markets and promise a generous interest 
rate.  What distinguishes these bonds from regular debt instruments is 
that the payment of interest and the repayment of principal are 
contingent upon the non-occurrence of some catastrophe-related 
trigger.
111
 Thus, if a mega-storm occurs that triggers the cat bond, the 
insurer who issued the bonds is relieved from the obligation to redeem 
the bond. The insurer is in effect able to use the principal to cover storm-
related losses.  Thus, as the use of cat bonds has been expanding rapidly 
over the past two decades, the capacity for the private insurability of 
extreme weather risks continues to expand as well.
112
 In the absence of 
publicly provided catastrophe insurance this expansion would have likely 
been greater. 
If the creation of adequate private insuring capacity for weather-
related disasters is in fact caused by persistent market failures, there are 
government interventions that, unlike the NFIP, deploy market 
incentives to reduce risk. Congress could, for example, adopt a federal 
reinsurance regime for severe storms similar to the one system it created 
for catastrophic terrorism risks in the wake of the September 11 attacks. 
Under the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act (TRIA), the first $27.5 billion 
of losses from a given act of terrorism (rising to $37.5 billion by 2020) is 
insured through private insurance markets, with the federal government 
provide providing 85% (falling to 80%) of the coverage above that 
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threshold up to a cap of $100 billion.
113
 Proponents of TRIA argue that 
the retentions built into such a regime provide considerable incentive for 
insurers to compete on price, while eliminating the downside uncertainty 
associated with the truly cataclysmic disasters. The hope is that the 
gradually decreasing federal reinsurance will encourage the flow of 
private capital into the terrorism-insurance business. Something similar 
could be done with catastrophic weather risk.
114
   
V. CONCLUSION 
We concluded that insuring capacity is not an insurmountable 
problem for private insurance of weather risk. However, affordability 
may well be.  In areas subject to severe weather, private insurance is 
offered, but priced at full risk it is expensive, and for many unaffordable. 
True, without insurance these homeowners would also be unable to 
rebuild their property if lost, and insuring it might be a rational cost-
minimizing choice. But it is still a luxury that many cannot afford (and, 
as explained above, were not factoring in when moving to the area). 
Means-tested subsidies may be designed only for the truly needy,
115
 but 
short of a mandate to insure, many residents of hazard-prone area would 
remain uninsured against weather devastation. What would happen in 
these communities after a disastrous storm? 
Collectively-provided disaster relief is the common response. 
Major disasters have a way of arousing a strong urge to support the 
victims. Such catastrophes generate an extraordinary amount of media 
attention and trigger a demand by the public to lend a collective hand—
paid for by taxpayers—to the unlucky few, culminating in special 
legislative action to appropriate funds, such as the one following the 
September 11
th
 attacks.
116
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When the magnitude of destruction caused by weather disasters is 
exceptionally high relative to past trajectories—when they reach more 
victims at greater scale and cause deeper misery than prior patterns 
predict—ad hoc relief is set in motion. Hurricanes Katrina and Sandy are 
examples of such events, exceptional in the magnitude and scope of 
harm and destruction they inflicted on entire communities.
117
 The 
corresponding federal disaster relief for the 2005 hurricane season and 
for Hurricane Sandy totaled $109 billion and $66 billion, respectively.
118
 
The emergence of ad-hoc funds for relief from disasters is a 
testament to the collective’s conviction that shifting the loss from the 
direct victims is a way to mitigate the overall devastating impact of a 
disaster. For one, the loss is thus borne by a broader pool of payers, 
unable to drain the high marginal utility regions of people’s welfare 
functions. Moreover, with the geographical concentration of victims, 
disasters have a “super-additive” impact, destroying not only the sum of 
the individual properties or lives, but entire communities.  Thus, unlike 
more routine loss events (such as those that fall below the disaster 
declaration threshold), relief for truly catastrophic disasters is not 
regarded as a bailout of the irresponsibly uninsured.
119
    
If disaster relief is an irresistible instinct of a decent society, it is 
a social insurance scheme that people—especially if uninsured through 
ordinary means—can rely on. It matters not that many of the victims 
could have purchased insurance (does the Coast Guard refrain from 
rescuing a drowning vessel that failed to equip itself with adequate life 
boats?)  This social insurance can be eliminated if people buy insurance 
policies. Hence, the government’s subsidy of such policies can be 
understood as an attempt to shift from funding completely free ex post 
relief to funding a cost-sharing scheme.  
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We can end this article with a call for ending government-run 
weather insurance, replacing it with more selective policies of need-
based subsidies.
120
 This would eliminate the inefficient incentives to 
develop and redevelop coastal land, as well as the regressive 
redistribution. But where is the sense in such naïve proposal? Congress 
did enact a law to eliminate the flood insurance subsidies—a bipartisan 
law remarkably passed in the peak days of partisan gridlock—only to 
quickly toss it out in an even more widely supported bill. Insurance 
affordability, it turns out, is one of the most effective political calls to 
arms, resulting here in a premium scheme that will likely remain in place 
for decades. We can only contribute to clarifying its enormous social 
cost. 
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